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ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court's Failure to Strike Union Pacific's Amended Memorandum 
Was an Abuse of Discretion. 
Union Pacific responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 
refused to deny the motion for summary judgment because it was not accompanied by a 
supporting memorandum of points and authorities as required by Rule 4-501 (1)(A) of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. (Br. App. at 42-43.) 
The trial court entered an amended scheduling order establishing November 30, 
1999, as the dispositive motion cutoff date. (R. 660-01.) On the last possible day, Union 
Pacific filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. 819-21.) That same day, the trial court 
denied Union Pacific's application to file the non-conforming memorandum in support of 
the motion for summary judgment. As such, when it filed the motion for summary 
judgment, and for nearly three weeks thereafter, Union Pacific had a motion but no 
supporting memorandum lodged in the trial court. The absence of a supporting 
memorandum meant that the motion for summary judgment did not comply with Rule 4-
501(1)(A), and was subject to being stricken. 
The trial court nevertheless allowed to Union Pacific to file the amended 
memorandum. The trial court's disregard for its own scheduling order was arbitrary. For 
no expressed or apparent reason, the trial court effectively adopted a new scheduling 
order. This was arbitrary, and an abuse of discretion. 
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II. The Trial Court's Failure to Strike Union Pacific's Exhibits was an Abuse of 
Discretion, 
Union Pacific does not dispute that the affidavits of John Ivester, Janice Arthur and 
Michael Bernard had to "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). It further does not dispute that the exhibits in question must be 
admissible in evidence to be considered in support of summary judgment. (Br. of App. 
at 43-44.) These requirements mirror those that apply to the admissibility of all evidence. 
"Application for Employment." Union Pacific responds that "Mr. Francisconi 
himself authenticated the Terms and Conditions of Employment, ..." (Br. App. at 44.) 
It quotes Mr. Francisconi's deposition testimony, where he recognized his signature on a 
page. (Br. App. at 44-45.) 
Exhibit a to Union Pacific's memorandum in support of the motion for summary 
judgment was never shown to Mr. Francisconi at his deposition. Mr. Francisconi's 
counsel objected to the document that was offered at the deposition as an incomplete copy 
of whatever it purported to be. (R. 1198.) As for the three page document that he was 
shown at his deposition, Mr. Francisconi stated that he did not recognize the document, 
which was dated August 10, 1970, and did not recall signing it. (Id.) As such, Mr. 
Francisconi did not authenticate the document; he clearly stated he has no personal 
knowledge as to whether the document is or is not what it purports to be. (Id.) 
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Besides the testimony of Mr. Francisconi, Union Pacific proffered no other 
evidence to authenticate the "Application for Employment."l Consequently, the document 
should have been stricken. Union Pacific's plea to disregard the lack of authentication 
because "Mr. Francisconi has never argued that the document is a fabrication" (Br. App. 
at 45), should be rejected. 
Union Pacific offers no response to Mr. Francisconi's claim that Mr. Bernard's 
affidavit does not overcome the hearsay objection. Mr. Bernard's affidavit contains only 
conclusory assertions. It contains no facts whatsoever establishing Mr. Bernard is a 
"qualified witness" with personal knowledge of the authenticity of the document, and 
establishing on the basis of personal knowledge the foundation required under Rule 803(6). 
See Trolley Square Ass's v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 66 (Utah App. 1994). The only "fact" 
in Mr. Bernard's affidavit is the identification of his position as Director of Auditing. This 
"fact" alone could not qualify this document under the business records exception. 
Further, Mr. Francisconi's signature on the document was not an admission as to 
the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that the document was his employment 
application. It was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rely upon a document for 
which no personal knowledge whatsoever was offered to establish a hearsay exception. 
1
 At the end of footnote 18, Union Pacific makes a cursory and unsupported claim that 
"Mr. Bernard's affidavit is sufficient to authenticate the entire document." (Br. App. at 45 
n. 18.) However, nowhere in his affidavit does Mr. Bernard allege, much less show, that he 
has personal knowledge of the document. He does not state, for example, that he witnessed 
the signature on the document. 
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Affidavit of John Ivester with attached "In Lieu of Lodging Schedule." Union 
Pacific responds, in the main, that Mr. Ivester's affidavit is not hearsay because it is based 
on "business records maintained in the normal course of business." (Br. App. at 47.) 
This response is misleading because, at the same time he asserts that business records form 
the foundation for his affidavit, Mr. Ivester also asserts each of the receipts submitted 
under the "in lieu of" policy excluded any information on the specific items that were 
purchased for a host. Thus, information on the purchase of each of the items listed in 
paragraphs 1 through 4 of Union Pacific's statement of facts was obtained from a source 
outside the company. 
Union Pacific readily admits in its statement of facts that Mr. Ivester formed his 
opinions from American Express statements obtained by the company. (Br. App. at 4.) 
He also "contacted certain stores directly and obtained itemized" receipts. In the absence 
of direct testimony from an American Express records custodian, and the alleged store 
personnel, Mr. Ivester's affidavit was inadmissible hearsay because he had no personal 
knowledge of the receipts and the source of his information was hearsay.2 
"Interview Summary" prepared by Janice Arthur. Objection is withdrawn to the 
admissibility of Ms. Arthur's affidavit. 
2
 The contention that the Schedule is accompanied by "circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness" is misleading. Mr. Ivester has never identified the persons who provided 
the outside information upon which he relies. Mr. Francisconi moved to strike Mr. Ivester's 
affidavit precisely because the underlying source of the information is unknown. 
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" Summary " of alleged findings of corporate audit staff. Union Pacific responds that 
the "summary" qualifies as a business record under Rule 803(6). That rule requires the 
report to be transmitted by "a person with knowledge." Neither the "summary" nor the 
affidavit of Mr. Bernard identify the source of the matters asserted therein, and as such a 
particularized assertion of personal knowledge is entirely lacking. 
Letter from Larry L. Reiff dated June 7. 1996. This letter is not subject to a 
business records exception through the testimony of Mr. Messner, who did not establish 
any foundation for the exception. Additionally, there is no showing the letter was prepared 
as part of a regularly conducted business activity. 
Letter from Larry L. Reiff to Dennis Seals. The same argument. 
Letter from Rene Orosco to Kevin L. Newton, and letter from P.P. Matter to 
Kevin L. Newton. Union Pacific has never authenticated these documents, or established 
any hearsay exception. Its conclusory allegation that these two letters are subject to a 
business records exception is without any merit. Clearly, the letters were not prepared as 
part of a regularly conducted business activity. 
III. Summary Judgment Standard. 
The proper standard is fully described as follows: summary judgment is appropriate 
only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Francisconi and 
drawing all reasonable inferences from the evidence in favor of finding a material issue of 
fact, no reasonable jury could conclude that an implied contract exists. 
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IV. Employment Contract Claims, 
A. Gene Francisconi Did Not Agree in Writing to be an At-Will Employee. 
Union Pacific contends that Mr. Francisconi agreed, in writing, to be an at-will 
employee, "and further no change in his status could occur except by an express writing 
on his employment contract."3 (Br. App. at 14.) 
Union Pacific's argument here is effectively this: even if Union Pacific makes a 
unilateral offer to form a contract with terms other than at-will, the offer is invalid in the 
event the "special conditions" section of the employment agreement is unannotated. The 
law is otherwise, however, and requires any such alleged disclaimer to be clear and 
conspicuous, and within the employee handbook that contains the offer. See Hamilton v. 
Parkdale Care Center, Inc., 904 P.2d 1110, 1112 (Utah App. 1995).4 
For the alleged "special conditions" provision to effectively disclaim any contractual 
limitation on Union Pacific's right to terminate Mr. Francisconi without cause, that 
provision must be a prominent part of the handbooks that constitute the "in lieu of" policy 
3
 This argument is ironic because, when he began his employment with Union 
Pacific in 1970, Mr. Francisconi was not an at-will employee. As a union employee until 
1976, Mr. Francisconi was classified as an "agreement employee." (R. 1024.) There is 
no "special condition" noted in the subject document to reflect the fact that, for the first 
five years of his employment, Mr. Francisconi was not an at-will employee. Additionally, 
the document Union Pacific denominates "Terms and Conditions of Employment" was a 
subject of Mr. Francisconi's motion to strike fact exhibits, and is inadmissible. 
4
 Hamilton provides that factors relevant in determining whether a disclaimer is clear 
and conspicuous include:"(1) the prominence of the text; (2) the placement of the disclaimer 
in the handbook; and (3) the language of the disclaimer." Id. 
6 
and the UPGRADE Policy. However, the alleged "special conditions" disclaimer is not 
a part of these handbooks, and is an inconspicuous part of a separate document bearing a 
1970 date. (R. 097-0104.) Further, the two implied contracts created by Union Pacific's 
oral promises have no connection whatsoever to a handbook. Accordingly, the alleged 
"special conditions" disclaimer is without effect. 
The issue in question is whether Union Pacific made the four unilateral offers of 
employment other than at-will. If it did, then any alleged "special conditions" disclaimer 
tucked away in an aged document is irrelevant. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 
603 (1972) (employer's de facto and written policies may create employment contract even 
where policy manual states to the contrary). Each such offer from Union Pacific implicitly 
waived any right to later enforce a "special conditions" disclaimer. 
B. The "In Lieu of" Policy Created an Implied Contract. 
Union Pacific responds that the "in lieu of" policy does not manifest an intent to 
offer employment other than at-will. (Br. App. at 17.) The response is misplaced. While 
focused on the "in lieu of" policy, this implied contract arises from the broader 
circumstances of Mr. Francisconi's employment. 
Mr. Francisconi could not perform the job of safety manger without extensive 
travel. (R. 1252-53.) The inference must be made in favor of Mr. Francisconi that the 
parties contemplated that extensive travel would result in necessary use of the expense 
policy, and in particular the "in lieu of" policy. The ability to anticipate that the expense 
7 
policy would have to be used meant that the parties were aware an implied contract had 
been offered and accepted. Thus, Mr. Francisconi agreed to use the expense policy, and 
thereby perform his job, in return for a promise that Union Pacific would not terminate 
him for his proper use of the "in lieu of policy. 
Union Pacific contends that Mr. Francisconi abused the "in lieu o f policy, and that 
this renders Metcalfv. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989) distinguishable. 
But Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of policy is highly disputed. 
Although a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, Metcalf is in fact on point. There 
is no other case in Utah that is analogous to this situation. Robertson v. Utah Fuel 
Company is distinguishable because the drug policy in that case was not an integral part 
of the plaintiffs employment. Here, by contrast, Mr. Francisconi could not perform his 
job without using the expense policy.5 
C. The UPGRADE Policy Created an Implied Contract. 
5
 The case of Cook v. lions First Natl Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1996) is 
instructive. There the employer argued, much as Union Pacific does, that the sick leave 
policy merely provided a schedule for accrual of sick leave. Id. at 59. This Court rejected 
that argument as too narrowly drawn. Such an interpretation "would defeat the very 
purpose for which parties contract to obtain sick leave. Employees do not contract with 
an employer to receive sick leave merely to watch their hours accrue. At some point, the 
employees will use those accrued hours to take time off to take care of their health." Id. 
Applied to the formation of an implied contract other than at-will, the court in Metcalf, 
applying another sick leave policy, concluded that the act of offering a policy signifies 
more than just the mere right to, for instance, accrue sick leave or, as here, obtain 
reimbursement of expenses. 788 P.2d at 749. 
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Union Pacific mainly responds that the UPGRADE Policy does not manifest an 
intent to offer employment other than at-will. (Br. App. at 20-23.) Contrary to Union 
Pacific's assertion, opposition to the motion for summary judgment relies exclusively on 
objective evidence. Mr. Francisconi believes that Level 5 UPGRADE was available to 
him, but it is only the objective evidence, and in particular Union Pacific's conduct and 
words, that is relevant. This objective evidence is almost entirely undisputed. 
Union Pacific does not dispute that the UPGRADE Policy makes certain promises 
to a terminated employee, including the guarantee of a formal hearing, and review by an 
executive committee.6 It also does not dispute that Mr. Francisconi was terminated 
without the benefit of these Level 5 procedures; Level 5 UPGRADE contains no language 
excluding managers from its procedures; Mr. Francisconi never received training in the 
UPGRADE Policy, or was otherwise told by anyone that managers are excluded from 
coverage; and a Vice President of Union Pacific could not say that a writing has ever been 
sent to employees stating that the UPGRADE Policy is not available to managers. 
Nor does Union Pacific dispute that it caused the handbook constituting the 
UPGRADE Policy to be affirmatively delivered to Mr. Francisconi; there was no reason 
6
 For instance: "A formal hearing is required for Level 5 cases." (R. 1148.) 
"Discipline cases for Level 5 violations will be reviewed for consistent policy application by 
an Executive Committee consisting of Representatives from human Resources, Labor 
Relations, and the Employing Department." (R. 1145.) At the time of the Omaha meeting, 
Mr. Francisconi understood Level 5 UPGRADE "to mean that I would have the right to a 
hearing on the merits of my dismissal, and the right to have a committee review any adverse 
decision resulting from the hearing." (R. 1279.) 
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for Mr. Francisconi to receive the pamphlet, the cover page for which is dated May 27, 
1994, if it did not apply to him since he had not supervised employees since 1976; at least 
two present or former managers of Union Pacific testified they believe the UPGRADE 
Policy applies to all employees, including themselves; and Union Pacific's representatives 
mentioned UPGRADE to Mr. Francisconi at the meeting in Omaha on April 26, 1996. 
As argued in the principal brief, it cannot be said that no reasonable jury, viewing 
the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Francisconi, and drawing all inferences 
from the evidence in favor of finding a material issue of fact, could conclude that these 
objective facts created an implied contract. Union Pacific delivered the handbook to Mr. 
Francisconi, and the handbook contains an express offer of employment other than at-will 
with respect to discharge. Indeed, Union Pacific does not dispute Mr. Francisconi's claim 
that Level 5 UPGRADE limits its right to discharge an employee, but contends that the 
limitations do not apply to Mr. Francisconi. 
In response to this showing, Union Pacific refers to certain language and "structure" 
of the UPGRADE Policy, and claims that the Policy has "never" been applied to 
managerial employees. (Br. App. at 20-23.) 
Union Pacific does not recite language in the UPGRADE Policy which expressly 
excludes managers from coverage, or expressly limits coverage to union employees. 
Instead, it retreats to an argument that the UPGRADE Policy must be " vread as a whole, 
in an attempt to harmonize and give effect to all of the contract provisions.'" (Br. App. 
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at 20, quoting Elm, Inc. v. M.T. Enterprises, Inc., 968 P.2d 861, 863 (Utah App. 1998).) 
However, Elm is inapposite, and concerned a dispute between an employee lessor and 
employee lessee in connection with the payment of payroll and other expenses. That case 
establishes no rule of construction applicable to an implied employment contract.7 
The language invoked by Union Pacific is irrelevant because the claim in question 
is predicated on breach of an implied contract wherein Union Pacific did not comply with 
its procedure for discharge. Mr. Francisconi has never alleged that other procedures in 
the UPGRADE Policy created employment other than at-will since they do not concern 
discharge. Only Level 5 UPGRADE concerns discharge, and therefore only Level 5 
UPGRADE could create an implied contract of employment other than at-will. Only the 
direct references to Level 5 UPGRADE are relevant. 
As noted above, Union Pacific does not dispute that Level 5 UPGRADE limits its 
right to discharge an employee. Accordingly, Union Pacific's request for consideration 
of other language in the UPGRADE Policy is really a claim that the handbook contains one 
or more disclaimers. 
As further noted above, a disclaimer is only effective if it is clear and conspicuous. 
See Hamilton, 904 P.2d at 1112. Union Pacific claims the UPGRADE Policy contains 
7
 No Utah court has ever required an employee-plaintiff to show that a handbook 
is susceptible to harmonization. Indeed, such a rule of construction would make no sense 
in this context since, by definition, an implied contract is created from the totality of the 
circumstances, which may or may not include a single, written document. 
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references to "collective bargaining agreements" and to "interactions" between 
management and union representatives. (Br. App. at 21.) However, none of these 
references concerns discharge. Further, none of these references contains prominent text, 
is set off in the handbook, or employs disclaiming language. As such, the language and 
"structure" referenced by Union Pacific may not serve to disclaim the offer the Policy 
makes through Level 5 UPGRADE. 
Even if the offer concerning Level 5 UPGRADE is interpreted along with the other 
language invoked by Union Pacific, the UPGRADE Policy still provided a definite offer 
to Mr. Francisconi. A reasonable employee such as Mr. Francisconi would have read 
Union Pacific's chosen language in conjunction with the first page of the handbook-the 
only page likely to be read by all employees who received the handbook. The first page 
is a letter from the Chairman and CEO of Union Pacific, and is addressed to his "Fellow 
Employee." (R. 1143.) It goes on to provide that the UPGRADE Policy would be 
implemented "across the entire railroad system," and would benefit "all employees." {Id.) 
Thus, any reference in the text of the Policy to collective bargaining agreements or 
"interaction" between management and union representatives would be perceived by a 
reasonable person as entirely consistent with the representation that the UPGRADE Policy 
concerns "all employees" of Union Pacific. 
Certainly, Union Pacific is not the first employer to claim that grievance procedures 
found in an employee handbook do not apply to managers. In Jones v. Lake Park Care 
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Center, Inc., 569 N.W.2d 369 (Iowa 1997), for instance, an employer argued that an 
employee handbook was not intended to apply to the administrator of a care center. The 
Iowa Supreme Court rejected the employer's argument, and affirmed the trial court's 
award of damages to the administrator for the employer's failure to follow a progressive 
discipline policy. The court found persuasive certain language of the handbook which 
provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
This booklet is designed to inform every employee of what is expected 
from them as an employee f the Lake Park Care Center, and also to 
tell all employees what they can expect of the Lake Park Care Center. 
Id. at 375 (original italics). Similarly, the page one references to "all employees" of 
Union Pacific and implementation "across the entire railroad system" evidenced an 
objective intent to offer employment other than at-will. 
Just as it was in the trial court, Union Pacific's claim that the UPGRADE Policy 
has "never" been applied to managerial employees is still a red herring. Union Pacific's 
subjective belief that the UPGRADE Policy does not apply to managers is irrelevant, just 
as Mr. Francisconi's subjective belief is not dispositive. Thus, largely unsubstantiated 
statements concerning the UPGRADE Policy's "history" have no bearing on this inquiry. 
All that matters are the words and conduct of Union Pacific as communicated to Mr. 
Francisconi. Judge Learned Hand explained this rule: 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached 
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
13 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, 
however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he 
used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning 
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held . . . 
.[Hotchkiss v. Natl City Bank, 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911).] 
Thus, irrespective of what the employer purportedly intended, the delivery of the 
UPGRADE Policy along with all the other objective circumstances recounted above 
created an implied contract of employment other than at-will.8 The terms: a grievance 
procedure at least equivalent to Level 5 UPGRADE, including a formal hearing on the 
merits of the discharge. 
D. The Oral Promise that Gene Francisconi Could Keep His Job in 
Exchange for Signing the Statement Created an Implied Contract. 
As set forth in the principal brief, this claim is based on an oral promise made to 
Mr. Francisconi towards the end of the Omaha meeting on April 26, 1996. Mr. 
Francisconi posed the question of what he could do to keep his job and avoid discharge as 
a result of the company's audit. Union Pacific's representative, Gary Lottman, replied that 
Mr. Francisconi could keep his job in exchange for writing and signing a statement that 
Mr. Lottman would dictate to Mr. Francisconi.9 (R. 1387.) Mr. Francisconi accepted this 
Union Pacific's reference to Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 
1382 (Utah App. 1995) is misplaced. That case was reviewed on appeal after a trial, not 
summary judgment. Id. at 1143. The case was decided on the finding that the handbook 
excluded any requirement of a written warning or suspension subject to a hearing before 
discharge. Id. As such, the subsequent comments in the decision are dicta. 
9
 Mr. Lottman: "'What do you think you need to do to keep your job?'" (R. 1264.) 
Mr. Francisconi: "'Well, you tell me what I need to do. I'm willing to make restitution if you 
14 
offer, and wrote out the statement that Mr. Lottman dictated to him because it was Mr. 
Francisconi's "understanding that by giving this statement I was saving my job." (R. 
1264.) Mr. Lottman admits he suggested Mr. Francisconi provide a statement. (R. 1344.) 
Union Pacific's response is that its representatives at the meeting, all of whom are 
still employees, contradict Mr. Francisconi's account. (Br. App. at 25.) It is axiomatic 
that "v [o]ne sworn statement under oath is all that is necessary to create a factual issue, 
thereby precluding summary judgment.'" Nyman v. McDonald, 966 P.2d 1210, 1213 
(Utah App. 1998) {quoting Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 957 (Utah 
App. 1989)). Any question of Mr. Francisconi's credibility is for the fact finder. 
Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing Co., 844 P.2d 303, 307 (Utah 1992) and Wood v. 
Utah Farm Bureau Insur. Co., 2001 UT App 35, 19 P.3d 392 require reversal of the trial 
court on the basis of Mr. Francisconi's sworn testimony.10 The meeting in Omaha 
concerned Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu of policy. (Br. App. at 3-4.) Mr. 
Francisconi was told he could keep his job if he signed the statement concerning his use 
think I've done something wrong. Tell me what you want me to do."' Mr. Lottman: "' Well, 
the first you can do to save your job is to fill out a statement.'" (Id.) 
10
 The continuing vitality of Sanderson (holding that an oral statement that "the job 
would be there" when the employee recovered from his illness was a clear manifestation 
of intent not to terminate), was recently reaffirmed in Wood, wherein this Court reversed 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer because the employee 
established a question of fact as to whether an implied contract existed. The employee 
stated in his affidavit that a manager "in our weekly review sessions after I signed the 1994 
Career Agent Contract, affirmed to me that I would not be terminated unless I failed to 
meet the goals in the October 15, 1993 letter." Id. 19 P.3d at 398. 
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of the "in lieu o f policy. (R. 1264; R. 1344.) Effective the next day, Union Pacific 
terminated Mr. Francisconi solely for alleged violations of the "in lieu o f policy. (R. 
1377.) 
Union Pacific further responds that the "Railroad never actually promised he could 
keep his job in exchange for a statement. Rather, Mr. Lottman allegedly said the s first 
thing' he could do to save his job was to fill out a statement. . . . " (Br. App. 25, emphasis 
removed.) This argument turns on the existence of intervening conditions of continued 
employment. Thus, Union Pacific's argument must fail because it does not point to any 
intervening conditions it attached to its promise that Mr. Francisconi could keep his job 
in exchange for the statement. By making the statement the first thing required for Mr. 
Francisconi to keep his job, and then not requiring anything else, the statement was in fact 
the only thing Union Pacific demanded in return for the promise of continued employment. 
Union Pacific's promise in this regard clearly manifests an intent to limit its right 
to terminate Mr. Francisconi in connection with his use of the "in lieu o f policy. Either 
with or without the words "first thing," Union Pacific promised Mr. Francisconi he could 
keep his job in exchange for the statement. There was nothing ambiguous about the 
objective import of Union Pacific's words: provide the statement, and you can "keep your 
job." (R. 1387.) 
The argument that the implied contract lacks consideration is disingenuous. It is 
well established that an employee's continued employment supplies adequate consideration 
16 
to support an employer's unilateral offer of employment other than at-will. See, e.g., 
Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998).n 
The fact that Mr. Francisconi disavows the statement has no bearing on the 
adequacy of the consideration given to Union Pacific. Courts do not as a rule inquire into 
the adequacy of consideration. Reese v. Reese, 1999 UT 75, 1f 27, 984 P.2d 987, 995. 
Union Pacific requested the statement in exchange for the promise, and, because Mr. 
Francisconi prepared the statement dictated to him by Mr. Lottman, it received all that it 
was due. See Gorgoza, Inc. v. Utah State Road Comm yn, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah 1976) 
("If one party asks for and receives something which he would not otherwise be entitled 
to from the other, that is adequate consideration.") 
Because Mr. Francisconi alleges that there are circumstantial indicators that he was 
terminated due to the personal animosity of Mr. Shoener, Union Pacific concludes that Mr. 
Francisconi is foreclosed from establishing the existence of an implied contract on the basis 
of Mr. Lottman's promise. (Br. App. at 28.) 
Union Pacific's argument in this regard is non-sensical. Union Pacific's quotation 
from Sanderson is inapposite because it would only affect the situation in which the 
employer shows that the employee was terminated for a reason unrelated to the oral 
promise. Here, by contrast, Union Pacific claims it terminated Mr. Francisconi in 
11
 But for Union Pacific's wrongful termination of Mr. Francisconi, he would have 
continued his employment of 26 years. Union Pacific cannot claim that it did not receive 
the return benefit of Mr. Francisconi's employment when it had terminated him. 
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connection with his use of the "in lieu of policy. (R. 1377.) Mr. Francisconi's use of 
the "in lieu o f policy is the subject of Mr. Lottman's promise. 
E. The Oral Promise that Gene Francisconi Could Choose Level 5 
UPGRADE Created an Implied Contract. 
After Mr. Francisconi had signed the statement, Union Pacific's senior 
representative at the Omaha meeting, Neil Vargason, offered Mr. Francisconi the 
opportunity to invoke Level 5 UPGRADE in exchange for continued employment. (R. 
1265.)12 Mr. Vargason admits he may have mentioned Level 5 UPGRADE to Mr. 
Francisconi (R. 1366). Mr. Lottman admits he definitely mentioned Level 5 UPGRADE. 
("I brought up the UPGRADE Policy to him.") (R. 1345.) Mr. Vargason promised Mr. 
Francisconi he could keep his job, subject to Level 5, or its equivalent, review of his 
employment. Mr. Francisconi accepted the offer, but was discharged effective the next 
day. 
Union Pacific's promise was functionally the same as the employer's promise in 
Wood v. Utah Farm Bureau Insur. Co. There the employee was told he would not be 
terminated "unless I failed to meet the goals in the October 15, 1993 letter." 19 P.3d at 
398 (emphasis added). That is no different than requiring Mr. Francisconi to satisfy Level 
5 review of his employment. 
12
 Mr. Vargason: "'You have two choices. We can either put you in Level 5 of 
UPGRADE or you can sign a resignation which we have prepared for you at this time to 
sign.'" Mr. Francisconi: "I informed them I had no intention of signing a resignation and 
put me in Level 5 of UPGRADE . . . " (R. 1265.) 
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further responds tl lat Mi 1 ^ rancisconi shoi ilcl 1 ia\ c knowi i tl lat the 
offer was invalid because he should have known the UPGRADE Policy is not available to 
managers. In other words, Mr. Francisconi should have known that Union Pacific was 
making a bogus offer. But even assuming Level 5 UPGRADE was not available to 
managers, I Jnioii Pacific could still i i lake tl le of fei It a >i lid at ai i/y tii i le agi ee to i nodify 
t l i e t e r m s 0 | j ^ Francisconi ' s employment. Thus , the promise of Level 5 U P G R A D E 
meant at least the equivalent of a formal hearing on the merits of the discharge. (R. 1265.) 
V, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress . 
Union Pacific responds that, on the basis of the facts recited in the principal brief, 
Mi Francisconi can not satisfy his bin dei l of she >wing 1:1 lat I Jnk m I 'acific coi lducted itself 
in a way that offends the generally accepted standards of decency and moral i ty. 
The summary facts set forth in Mr . Francisconi ' s principal brief will not be repeated 
here . That presentation is not exhaustive, as it would be at trial The facts can be 
classified according to three time periods: ( I ) thecoei ck >i i ai id tl ireats n lade • at tl le Oi l lal la 
meeting on April 26 , 1996; (2) the continued threats and harassment that followed the 
meeting and through May 17, 1996, when Mr . Francisconi informed Union Pacific that 
he would not resign; and (3) the period after May 17th and until C O B R A coverage was 
t inall) pre >\ Meet oi I Jul) 8, 1/996 Evidence of I ••: • • ific's malice is also shown, by the 
extraordinary way in which M i . Francisconi was singled out from all other audited 
employees , and the indicators that Union Pacific, acting through its Vice President , Ar thur 
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Shoener, may have terminated Mr. Francisconi due to base personal animosity and 
revenge. 
These facts are substantial and largely undisputed. They reveal that Union Pacific's 
conduct was not pursuant to the exercise of legal rights. When the facts are viewed in the 
light most favorable to Mr. Francisconi, and all inferences are drawn from the facts in 
favor of Mr. Francisconi, a triable issue is raised as to whether Union Pacific acted beyond 
the strict confines of its examination of Mr. Francisconi's use of the "in lieu o f policy. 
The undisputed facts show, for example, that Union Pacific pursued a criminal case 
against Mr. Francisconi even though Union Pacific has never made a criminal referral as 
a result of an expense report audit. (R. 1571, at 3.) 
Moreover, contrary to the assertion in its response brief, Union Pacific improperly 
withheld COBRA coverage. By its own admission, when Mr. Francisconi could not be 
coerced into signing a resignation and release of liability agreement, Union Pacific 
backdated his termination date to April 27, 1996, the day after the Omaha meeting. (Br. 
App. at 8.) It then allowed his group medical coverage to lapse effective April 30, 1996. 
(Id.) 
Union Pacific did not deny COBRA coverage due to "gross misconduct" on the part 
of Mr. Francisconi. Thus, the termination was a "qualifying event" obligating Union 
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Pacific to notify Mr. Francisconi and his wife (also a beneficiary) within 44 days13 of his 
right to continuation coverage. Union Pacific has offered as proof of notification a letter 
from Larry Reiff dated June 7, 1996 (Br. App. at 32), but the undisputed evidence shows 
that ]\li. Francisconi did not receive actual notice mv . ' j 1220.) He 
elected coverage' for his wife ai id i eti lrned the election torn I tl le next day, (Id.) Notice 
was therefore received 54 days after termination, in clear violation of federal law. 
Coverage did not actually attach until July 3, 1996. (Id.) 
The claims herein do not include violation of the notice requirements of COBRA,14 
bi it I Jnioi i Pacific's disregai d foi tl ic >se requii ei i lents si lows its n lalice A iiAssistai.it Vice 
President of Union Pacific, Thomas Campbell, who knew that Ms . Francisconi suffered 
Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(a)(2), an employer has a duty to report most qualifying 
events, including the termination of employment, to its group health plan administrator 
within 30 days of the qualifying event. Geissal v. Moore Med. Corp., 524 U.S. 74, 81 , 118 
S.Ct. 1869, 1873 n. 6 (1998). The plan administrator has 14 days from notification to 
provide notice to the qualified beneficiary of the right to elect continuation coverage. 
Burgess v. Adams Tool & Engineering, Inc., 908 F.Supp. 473,478 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (citing 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1166(a)(4)). Where the employer is also the plan administrator, the courts are 
split on the notice requirements. In Hamilton v. Mecca, Inc., 930 F.Supp. 1540, 1553 (S.D. 
Ga. 1996), for example, the court held that the employer/plan administrator had to notify the 
employee within 14 days of termination of his right to continuation coverage. Larry Reiff 
is an employee of Union Pacific, and provided notification to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1137.) 
As such, Union Pacific is both the employer and plan administrator, and may have been 
required to notify Mr. Francisconi within 14 days of termination of his right to elect 
continuation coverage. However, no resolution of the lack of consensus is necessary because 
Union Pacific failed to provide notice within even the enlarged 44 day period. 
14A beneficiary may seek relief under 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a) against a plan 
administrator who fails to comply with the notice requirements. 
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from medical problems, in early May 1996, threatened Mr. Francisconi with cancellation 
of group medical insurance and denial of continuation coverage if he would not sign the 
release of liability agreement. (R. 1266-67.) This threat was repeated, and caused Mr. 
Francisconi great stress since his wife was scheduled to undergo non-elective surgery on 
June 5, 1996. (R. 1220.) That surgery was in fact canceled due to Union Pacific's failure 
to provide notice.15 (Id.) 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have variously described the standard 
applicable to an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. What has remained 
constant, however, is the requirement that the objectionable conduct offends the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality. In Retherford v. AT&T Communications, 844 
P.2d 949, 969-70 (Utah 1992), for instance, that meant conduct consisting of "shadowing 
[plaintiffs] movements, intimidat[ing] her with threatening looks and remarks, and 
manipulating] circumstances at her work in ways that made her job markedly more 
stressful. . ." 
15
 Congress, as one court stated, "did not enact COBRA for the purpose of 
providing employers with another negotiating lever." Lloynd v. Hanover Foods Corp., 
72 F.Supp.2d 469, 477 (D. Del. 1999) (finding that employer attempted to coerce 
employee to recharacterize her termination as "resignation" in exchange for which 
employer would agree to extend COBRA benefits; the court was "deeply disturbed by [the 
employer's] improper use of COBRA as a negotiating tool.") A higher level of concern 
should prevail here in light of the state of Ms. Francisconi's health at the time Union Pacific 
was using COBRA benefits as a negotiating tool to coerce a resignation. 
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VI. Defamation. 
Union Pacific responds that its communications were privileged. (Br. App. at 35-
36.) But this response must fail because a qualified privilege does not protect a defamatory 
statement when the defendant acted with malice or the statement is excessively published. 
Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). Mr. Francisconi has raised a 
tiiable issue as to whether Union Pacific's agents were motivated by malice, which "is 
ordinarily a facluiil issue." Id. at 59 (citing Lind v. Lynch, 665 P.2d 1276, 1279 (Utah 
1983)). 
Moreover, the statements from Union Pacific's agents to Ihomas Haig, and from 
Thomas Haig to Barbara Tower, were excessively published. Union Pacific does not show 
thai Mi I Lug or Ms. Tower had any connection to the audit. Additionally, the fact that 
Mr. Francisconi has not shown the basis for M Haig's utterance to Ms. Tower is 
unavailing to Union Pacific because it may be inferred that the only available source of the 
statements was the audit staff and the participants at the Omaha meeting. Within Union 
Pacific, only these persons had a valid reason for knowing the audit results. 
Union Pacific contends its descriptions of Mr. Francisconi as a liar and a thief and 
threats of criminal prosecution were "nothing more than the Railroad confronting an 
employee on a legitimate matter of concern to the company-abuse of the v in lieu of 
policy." (Br. App. at 36.) A qualified privilege attaches only to "certain situations in 
which a defendant seeks to vindicate or further an interest v regarded as being sufficiently 
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important to justify some latitude for making mistakes....'" Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991) (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts). But it 
cannot be said that the company's concern for "abuse of the vin lieu of policy" had any 
connection to the defamatory statements. 
The fact that Union Pacific's agents made the statements directly to Mr. Francisconi 
at the meeting in Omaha does not preclude a claim for defamation, since persons in 
addition to the speakers were also present. Six persons attended the meeting in addition 
to Mr. Francisconi. (R. 1254.) Union Pacific does not show that all its agents at the 
meeting uttered defamatory statements. 
VII. Fraud. 
Union Pacific responds that Mr. Francisconi's testimony cannot create a genuine 
issue of material fact. (Br. App. at 39-40.) The argument again focuses on the words 
"first thing" in connection with Mr. Lottman's request that Mr. Francisconi prepare the 
statement. As noted above in the section on contract claims, these words do not detract 
from the promise that was made because Union Pacific does not point to intervening 
conditions; the statement was in fact the only condition of the promise. Moreover, the fact 
that Union Pacific's current employees contradict Mr. Francisconi's testimony concerning 
Mr. Lottman's promise is without affect. A jury could still find in favor of Mr. 
Francisconi based solely on his testimony. 
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The contention that the promise of continued employment conceri H * : i u re act on 
the part of Union Pacific turns on the characterization of what was being offered. Union 
Pacific effectively terminated Mr. Francisconi at the Omaha meeting. Thus, the threat of 
termination was presently existing wher romise was made at the meeting. 
Mr. Francisconi relied on the misrepresentation to his detriment tiecause the 
inference must be made in his favor that by asking for the statement, Union Pacific wo 
not have terminated him in the absence of a statement. 
roiNrLUSiON • 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Francisconi respectfully requests that the Court reverse 
the trial court's entry of judgment in favor of Union Pacific and rriiinid this case for a 
trial. 
RFSPB'TH i[ I.Y SUBMITTED this 22nd day of May, 2001. 
PARSONS, IMUXKINGHORN& PETERS 
DAVID J. BURN$ 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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